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Rethinking Radicalization
By Randy Borum
Senior Editor, Journal of Strategic Security
Over the course of the past decade, the United States and its international
partners have vacillated between waging war on al-Qaida, waging war on
terrorism, combating violent extremism, engaging in a battle of ideas, and
attempting to win hearts and minds. In a series of hard-learned lessons,
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency forces confronted the realization
that, even as they were steadily removing bad guys from battlespace, the
adversary forces were continuing to replenish and expand. It seemed necessary to look upstream for possible ways to stem the flow of new fighters
and supporters.
One result of that upstream reconnaissance was the idea of focusing on
"radicalization"—the process of developing extremist ideologies and
beliefs—as a precursor to terrorism. It was assumed that if we were trying
to counter an ideologically driven adversary, then mitigating or eliminating the power of the ideology would diminish the adversary's ranks. A less
belligerent population and a less volatile operating environment might
even be added benefits. It was a reasonable theory.
But distinguishing between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency
became a bit confusing. Although a global "war on terrorism" had been
declared, the conflicts on the ground were much more local. War-fighters
and analysts alike observed that terrorism was a tactic, not a clearly
defined enemy. Indeed, forces were not broadly patrolling the world looking for any hints of terrorism of every kind. The military forces were
mired in concentrated, complex, protracted, armed conflicts with adversaries who used—among other things—terrorist tactics. Security and
intelligence services were attempting to keep watch for any indication of a
pending terrorist attack that might be directed against their own nations
and national interests.
The global "war on terrorism" may have been a poor azimuth for the
desired objectives of the post-9/11 era, but terrorism itself and the use of
terrorist tactics were—and still are—pernicious problems. Efforts to focus
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on radicalization and radical ideologies in order to get ahead of the terrorism problem, however, faced a serious challenge: Most radicals did not
(and do not) engage in terrorism, and many terrorists did not (and do
not) "radicalize" in any traditional sense.
Adherence to radical beliefs is not irrelevant to countering terrorism or
advancing broader global security interests, but fanatically embracing an
ideology is neither a proxy for, nor a necessary precursor to, terrorism.
Conflating the two concepts undermines our ability to effectively counter
either of them. As John Horgan has so cogently argued, we need to be less
focused on why people engage in terrorism and more focused on how
they become involved.1 That's the context for the articles in this special
issue of JSS.
The issue begins with a two-part review of what is currently known about
radicalization as it relates to terrorism. The first part surveys a range of
definitions and ways that radicalization has been conceptualized by academics and law enforcement analysts. It goes on to suggest some potentially promising theories that might support further study of the processes
and mechanisms of radicalization into violent extremism.
In a sense, the article attempts to recast the popular notion of radicalization. I use the term—perhaps unadvisedly—"radicalization into violent
extremism" (RVE) to refer to the array of processes by which people come
to adopt beliefs that not only justify violence but compel it, and how they
progress—or not—from thinking to action.2
The second part reviews recent (post-9/11) conceptual models of the radicalization process and recent (post-9/11) empirical studies of RVE. Each
model, I conclude, remains underdeveloped; none of them yet has a very
firm social-scientific basis as an established "cause" of terrorism, and few
of them have been subjected to any rigorous scientific or systematic
inquiry.
I use the familiar term radicalization to refer to the process of developing
extremist ideologies and beliefs, and the term action pathways (or action
scripts) to describe the process of being involved in terrorism or engaging
in violent extremist actions. I intend for the distinction between these
concepts to acknowledge that "radicalizing" by developing or adopting
extremist beliefs is but one of many possible pathways into terrorism
involvement, and that the broader question is how people become
involved, stay involved, and sometimes disengage from terrorism.
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What makes this issue "special," however, is the collection of articles that
follows these reviews. It is a great privilege to include here contributions
from some wonderful, internationally known scholars in areas that are
analogous, or in some way related, to terrorism involvement, but who do
not necessarily regard themselves as "terrorism studies" researchers.
Each author has years of experience in his or her own field of inquiry, and
may be less encumbered by the conventions of terrorism-related research.
I asked each of them if they might reflect on what lessons they have
learned in their own areas of research that might be useful for the study of
RVE or involvement in terrorism. Their insights are well worth reading.
Scott Decker is one of the world's leading researchers on youth gangs. He
and David Pyrooz point out that while the factors explaining gang involvement and terrorism involvement may differ, commonalities among the
collective structures, dynamics, and processes might be mutually informative. Organizational structure, they have found, affects three categories
of activity: recruitment and joining, group process, and desistance. They
address the instrumental and symbolic (e.g., revenge, peer affiliation,
etc.) benefits that draw people in, evolving patterns of leadership, and the
emerging roles of the Internet and technology. Importantly, one of their
key conclusions is that "groups do not have to radicalize to be dangerous
or of concern."
Alpaslan Özerdem and Sukanya Podder study post-conflict reconstruction and reintegration of former combatants, including child soldiers.
They begin by observing that ideological radicalization is much less common and less prominent among child soldiers who are coopted in civil
conflicts than it is among terrorists. They explore the array of "push" and
"pull" factors—both material and affiliative—that affect recruitment into
armed conflict. They note that, even after completing a reintegration program, many youth are re-recruited, which they believe is caused by a misalignment between youth motivations and the imposed outcomes of
reintegration. They stress the need for youth to find nonviolent social and
political identities in post-conflict environments, and argue that families
and communities are often critical ingredients for success.
Remy Cross and David Snow consider radicalism within the context of
social movements. They distinguish among three types of radicalism:
"practice of high-risk or extreme movement activity, the process by which
activists become radicals, or an identity ascribed to those activists who
may or may not already be radicalized." They suggest that grassroots
social movements often serve as "free spaces" where people can explore
and solidify an identity that is dissonant with mainstream culture, and
insulate themselves from outside control or influence. That environment
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facilitates bonds of trust among small collectives of activists, known as
affinity groups. They go on to outline four common types of radicals—
opportunistic, coordinated, militant and loners—all of whom endorse
high-risk activism, but who often have differing characteristics and follow
different pathways.
Sara Savage has produced, over the years, some exceptionally thoughtful
work studying fundamentalism and the psychology of religion. Based on
that experience, she offers here four key lessons for the study of terrorism
involvement, and even introduces evidence for a promising intervention.
Lesson 1: Expect that sacred worldviews will be defended. She invokes
findings from The Fundamentalism Project showing systematic commonalities among very different fundamentalisms and ideologically driven
religious movements. Lesson 2: Avoid overgeneralizing—with a special
caution about characterizing "fundamentalism" in religions like Islam.
Lesson 3: Simple explanatory models will not suffice—Much like the evolution of ideas in the psychology of terrorism, Savage notes that early
study of fundamentalism in the psychology of religion was marked by a
search for aberrant mental or personality traits to explain the phenomenon. Lesson 4: Words rule—The authority of most fundamentalisms rest
on a foundation of some scripture, regarded as inerrant, that is interpreted by believers and then held out as "objective" truth. She concludes
with a fascinating description of an intervention to enhance "integrative
complexity" as a way to counter the "us vs. them" mentality among fundamentalist radicals.
Finally, economic sociologists Marco Goli and Shahamak Rezaei
empirically examine the question of whether the failure of Muslim
immigrants to integrate into a Western democratic society is linked to
militant Islamists beliefs, which they call "Radical Islamism." Using a
nationally representative sample of 1,113 young (ages fifteen–thirty)
people in Denmark with national ties to a "Muslim country," their results
do not support the idea that failed integration in a Western nation is a
major cause of radicalism, or that Muslim radicals integrate more poorly
there than non-radicals. They explored a wide range of factors associated
with sociocultural integration and compared them across a spectrum of
four ideological groups, with Group One representing non-radical
Muslims, and Group Four representing the Radical Islamists. They found
few, if any, significant differences.
Instead of viewing radicalization as a proxy for—or as a necessary precursor to—terrorism, my hope is that the collection of papers here may stimulate a greater focus on the broader issue of terrorism involvement.
Terrorism—regardless of which of the hundred definitions we use—is a
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moving target. It is also, of course, a tactic, not a discrete enemy. But as a
tactic, terrorism's character has changed and is continuing to change.
This is not simply a change in the weapons or devices being used, but in
who is using the tactic of terrorism, for what purpose, and to what effect.
Some of the conventions that have served us well in the past—if left unexamined—may constrain and impede our future progress in countering
terrorism and violent extremism. The ideas, for example, that terrorism is
best viewed as an expression of political violence; that terrorism is necessarily a group-related phenomenon; or that terrorism should be defined
by the actor's intent to influence a government, or specifically to cause
fear among a broader population, all may be negotiable in a twenty-first
century environment. I hope that the thoughtful contributions offered in
this volume will stimulate some reflection and critical thinking about the
concept of radicalization and about terrorism's evolving character.
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